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I. INTRODUCTION
Arbitration is the wave of the future in the legal world. This cost-
efficient process has become wildly popular in a variety of areas of the
law, and, up until recently, there were no indications that its growth
would be stopped. A new day was dawning for the world of alternative
dispute resolution. But, perceived flaws in the process and allegations of
corporate abuse in the consumer context have forced Congress's hand.2
There is a proposed amendment to the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA)
that would drastically change the landscape for arbitration by signifi-
cantly curtailing the enforceability of predispute arbitration clauses in a
variety of consumer agreements. The original proposed amendments to
the FAA are set forth in the Arbitration Fairness Act of 2007 (AFA),3
and they contain staggering changes to a law that was originally enacted
to reverse centuries of judicial hostility towards arbitration agreements.4
If the bill passes in its current form, 9 U.S.C. §2 will be amended so that
no predispute arbitration agreements will be allowed if they are in
employment, consumer, or franchise-dispute agreements. 5
One area that would be substantially affected by this proposed
amendment would be consumer-securities arbitration. It is a long-stand-
ing practice of the securities industry to require customers to sign con-
tracts containing clauses stating that the customer agrees to arbitrate any
dispute that arises.6 As a result of these predispute arbitration agree-
ments, there are thousands of consumer-securities cases arbitrated each
year through the Dispute Resolution Department at the Financial Indus-
try Regulatory Authority (FINRA).7 The passage of the AFA would
2. For a detailed explanation of how arbitration at FINRA is perceived, see Jill L. Gross &
Barbara Black, Perceptions of Fairness of Securities Arbitration: An Empirical Study, U. Cin.
Public Law Research Paper No. 08-01 (2008), available at http://papers.ssrm.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstractid=1090969. The results of this survey will be analyzed in more detail in Part 111.
3. H.R. 3010, 110th Cong. (2007), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/home/gpoxmIcll0/
h3010_ih.xml. The bill has since been reintroduced to the Senate in a different version that
contains all relevant provisions from the 2007 version titled "The Arbitration Fairness Act of
2009." See S. 931, 111 th Cong. (2009), available at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/billtext.xpd?
bill=sl 11-931.
4. Sherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 510 (1974).
5. H.R. 3010, 110th Cong. (2007), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/home/gpoxmlclI0/
h3010_ih.xml.
6. Jean R. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is it Just?, 57 STAN. L. REv. 1631,
1636 (2005).
7. In 2009, 4,481 cases were filed with FINRA as of July. Dispute Resolution Statistics,
http://www.finra.org/ArbitrationMediationlAboutFfNRADR/Statistics/index.htm (last visited
Sept. 4, 2009). FINRA is an independent securities regulator that is composed of over 5,000
brokerage firms throughout the country. Along with its dispute resolution department, FINRA also
serves as an industry regulator and an enforcer of federal-securities laws. For a general overview
of FINRA's operations, see About the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, http://www.finra.
org/AboutFINRAIindex.htm (last visited Jan. 2, 2009).
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mean that these cases would end up in court instead of at FINRA.
As Congress attempts to shed light on fairness in arbitration, the
McMahon8 decision's shadow is being completely eliminated. This sem-
inal case that allowed claims under §10(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 to be sent to arbitration via predispute agreements is in
danger of becoming obsolete. 9 Although there is no mention that the bill
is made to directly overturn McMahon, it will not be of much use if the
proposed amendments to the FAA are enacted.10 Congress has every
right to overturn a nonconstitutional judicial decision by enacting legis-
lation, but in this case their decision goes too far. 1 The McMahon
Court's reasoning remains true to this day, and recent developments in
FINRA's procedural rules bolster the argument that consumer-securities
arbitration should not fall under the umbrella of the AFA. 12 The point of
this article is not to argue that Congress cannot do this, 13 but that it
should not. As will be discussed throughout this paper, consumer-securi-
ties arbitration is special because of the procedure it employs to ensure
fair treatment for consumers. There may be areas of arbitration that need
to be changed. In all likelihood, there are, and Congress may be justified
in taking action in those fields. But consumer securities is not one of
them, and Congress should consider its unique qualities before making
any drastic changes.
After examining the McMahon decision, I will analyze whether
there was any external pressure on Congress from the public that led the
proponents of the bill to include consumer-securities arbitration. "[T]he
pressure of public opinion, sometimes manifested in Congressional
action, may force a change in government policy." 4 If there is over-
whelming support for change in the field, then Congress would have a
reason to act. "Citizens influence legislators' actions to the extent that
legislators' decisions reflect in some way citizens' preferences or poten-
8. Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
9. See Id. at 238.
10. I would not expect Congress to mention any case specifically by name when passing this
bill, given the general, all-encompassing language it uses.
11. For an interesting discussion of why consumer-securities arbitration could be considered
state action and challenged by a party on constitutional grounds, see Sarah Rudolph Cole,
Arbitration and State Action, 2005 B.Y.U. L. REv. 1 (2005).
12. The most important recent rule change tightens the standard for motions to dismiss before
a full hearing in the FINRA forum. For a brief discussion of this rule, see David E. Robbins, A Sea
Change Comes to Securities Arbitration: Codifying the Practice of Motions to Dismiss,
LexisNexis Expert Commentary, 2008 EMERGING ISSUEs 2359 (2008).
13. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985)
("Having made the bargain to arbitrate, the party should be held to it unless Congress itself has
evinced an intention to preclude a waiver of judicial remedies .... ").
14. Robert A. Sedler, The Media and National Security, 53 WAYNE L. REv. 1025, 1033
(2007).
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tial preferences about policy issues."15 For these reasons, the necessary
starting point for analyzing Congressional action is to look at the percep-
tion of consumer-securities arbitration among three influential subsec-
tions of the population-the judiciary, the general public, and the
academic community-in order to see if any one group has rung the
alarm to spur Congress into action. Part II of this paper will analyze the
McMahon decision and the reasoning that led the court to hold that
§10(b) claims could be sent to arbitration through predispute agree-
ments. This will give an accurate assessment of the current judicial per-
ception of consumer-securities arbitration. Part III deals with public
perception of the FINRA forum itself. The public perception of the
forum is important in determining whether Congress would be
encouraged to include consumer-securities arbitration under the
umbrella of the AFA. Part IV concerns academic perceptions of con-
sumer-securities arbitration-including perceived past errors by Con-
gress in attempting to regulate arbitration-as well as both the positive
and negative academic reactions to the developments in consumer-secur-
ities arbitration since the McMahon decision.16 The paper is organized
this way because, in order for Congress to be vindicated in choosing to
use the AFA to swallow up consumer-securities arbitration, there must
be some constituency that is crying out for them to act. As will be dis-
cussed in Parts II-IV, the reality of the situation is quite the opposite. By
and large, none of these groups has issued a resounding call to arms.
Next, the AFA itself will be examined to show that regardless of
perceptions, the evils that the bill is trying to address are not present in
consumer-securities arbitration. Part V details the AFA and gives a brief
glimpse into the reasoning of the main proponent of the bill. I am wait-
ing until Part V to discuss in detail the legislation I am attempting to
attack for a distinct purpose. In order to understand my strong opposition
to the AFA, it is essential to first understand the current perception of
consumer-securities arbitration. After examining precedent in the field
15. R. DOUGLAS ARNOLD, THE Locic OF CONGRESSIONAL ACTION 11 (1992).
16. For the purpose of this paper, it is not necessary to examine in detail the way the
securities industry perceives FINRA arbitration. It is overwhelmingly supportive, but, if the AFA
is meant to protect consumers, then most people will likely assume that the current system must
benefit the industry and would be skeptical of its support for arbitration. There is little wisdom in
asking a butcher what he thinks about vegans-the taint of self-interest (whether real or imagined)
obscures one's ability to perceive whatever truth may lurk in his response. Even so, the industry's
benefit does not have to be the consumer's loss. Not every legal issue is a zero-sum game. The
current system may be-and I will argue is-beneficial for both sides. For an intuitive look into
the specifics of the securities industry's support for mandated arbitration, see SECURITIES
INDUSTRY AND FINANCIAL MARKETS ASSOCIATION, WHITE PAPER ON ARBITRATION IN THE
SECURITIES INDUSTRY: THE SUCCESS STORY OF AN INVESTOR PROTECTION FOCUSED INSTITUTION
THAT HAS DELIVERED TimELY, COST-EFFECTIVE, AND FAIR RESULTS FOR OVER 30 YEARS (2007),
available at http://www.sifma.org/regulatory/pdf/arbitration-white-paper.pdf.
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and both the positive and negative academic opinions regarding this type
of arbitration, the stage will be set to put the AFA under the microscope.
Part VI of this paper will begin by highlighting some distinguishing
characteristics of consumer-securities arbitration by comparing con-
sumer-securities arbitration at FINRA to critiques of general mandated
arbitration. FINRA arbitration procedural guidelines and the process
provided by the forum are more than adequate and pass muster under the
requirements set forth in judicial decisions about arbitration in other
fields. In light of the process provided, it is clear that consumer-securi-
ties arbitration at FINRA should not fall under the unnecessarily broad
umbrella that the AFA has carelessly strewn over the arbitration world. I
will explain that not only are these amendments unnecessary for con-
sumer-securities arbitration, but that they could end up doing more harm
than good.17 This bill is an overzealous attempt by its creators to garner
political favor by seeming to protect the little guy, and its negatives far
outweigh its positives. These potentially harmful mistakes should not be
allowed to masquerade as a victory for consumer protectionism.
1 8
II. THE MCMAHON DECISION & JUDICIAL PERCEPTION OF
CONSUMER-SECURITIES ARBITRATION
Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon was a landmark
decision in the field of consumer-securities arbitration. In that case, the
plaintiffs sued their brokerage firm for a number of claims, one of which
was brought under §10(b)19 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(Exchange Act). The holding relevant to this paper was that consumers
with claims under the Exchange Act could be compelled to have them
decided in arbitration pursuant to predispute agreements. 20 The Court of
Appeals had held that the Supreme Court's decision declining to compel
arbitration of claims brought under§12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933
(Securities Act) in Wilko v. Swan2 1 should be extended to cover § 10(b)
17. For a discussion of relevant changes in pretrial dismissal procedures in the federal court
system compared to relevant procedures in consumer-securities arbitration, see infra Part VI(c).
18. I feel obligated to note that I spent twelve weeks working for FINRA in their Dispute
Resolution Department. I believe I have a moral-as well as an academic-responsibility to
disclose this so the reader can take it for what it's worth and make his or her own educated
decision. I have no bias to hide. I have excluded research from this paper that I think to be both
relevant and helpful to my thesis solely because it was commissioned by FINRA or another
organization composed of members of the securities industry, and I want to avoid any perception
of partiality.
19. Claims alleging the use of fraud or deception in the sale of securities are brought under
this rule. 15 U.S.C. §78j (2000).
20. Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 238 (1987).
21. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
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claims as well. 2 The McMahon Court disagreed with this line of reason-
ing because of the enormous advances that had taken place in consumer-
securities arbitration since the time of the Wilko decision.
A. Importance of Wilko Rejection
The logic behind the Wilko decision-and the Court's reasons for
declining to follow it-are illustrative of improved judicial confidence
in arbitration. In Wilko, the Court observed that any stipulation that
attempts to waive compliance with any provision of the Securities Act is
void.23 The Wilko Court then went on to explain that at that time-Wilko
was decided in 1953-the arbitration forums in place were not adequate
to enforce the provisions of the Securities Act that were favorable to the
purchasers of securities.24 The McMahon Court sent an unmistakable
message by saying "The conclusion in Wilko was expressly based on the
Court's belief that a judicial forum was needed to protect the substantive
rights created by the Securities Act .... -25
The McMahon's petitioned the Court to follow this same logic by
arguing that compelling arbitration would make it less likely that they
would recover on their Exchange Act claims, and the Court recognized
this line of reasoning as "the heart of the Court's decision in Wilko.
' '26
Nevertheless, the Court did not accept the McMahon's argument this
time around. The seeds for the McMahon Court's rejection of this pro-
position were planted in the dissent in Wilko. Justice Frankfurter refused
to follow the majority because he believed their distrust of arbitration
did not have any distinct factual or evidentiary basis.27 The McMahon
Court agreed with the dissent and found the conclusion that the Wilko
Court arrived at to "reflect a general suspicion of the desirability of arbi-
tration and the competence of arbitral tribunals-most apply with no
greater force to the arbitration of securities disputes than to the arbitra-
tion of legal disputes generally."28
The McMahon Court pointed out that the reasons that the Wilko
Court espoused have been systematically dismantled in the time since it
22. McMahon, 482 U.S. at 224.
23. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 434.
24. Id. at 435 ("Even though the provisions of the Securities Act, advantageous to the buyer,
apply, their effectiveness in application is lessened in arbitration as compared to judicial
proceedings.").
25. McMahon, 482 U.S. at 228.
26. Id. at 231.
27. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 439 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
28. McMahon, 482 U.S. at 231. This type of overgeneralization is being repeated by Congress
today. By lumping all consumer arbitration into the same group in lieu of actually examining the
process each forum provides, they have crafted a piece of legislation that ignores the distinctive
positive qualities of FINRA consumer-securities arbitration.
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was decided. In Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth,
Inc., the Court recognized that arbitral tribunals had the capacity to han-
dle complex antitrust claims29 and were capable of utilizing streamlined
procedural systems without consequently restricting substantive rights.3"
The Court had also already declined to apply Wilko's logic to interna-
tional agreements. In Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., the Court upheld a
predispute arbitration agreement to arbitrate the same type of Exchange
Act claim that was brought in McMahon, albeit in an international con-
text.3" After this slow deterioration of Wilko's impact, the final step in
the progression came when the McMahon Court unequivocally stated:
Thus, the mistrust of arbitration that formed the basis for the Wilko
opinion in 1953 is difficult to square with the assessment of arbitra-
tion that has prevailed since that time. This is especially so in light of
the intervening changes in the regulatory structure of the securities
laws. Even if Wilko's assumptions regarding arbitration were valid at
the time Wilko was decided, most certainly they do not hold true
today for arbitration procedures subject to the SEC's oversight
authority.32
The Court then went on to list the array of regulatory protections that the
rules of arbitration at the National Association of Securities Dealers
(NASD, which is now FINRA33) are subject to.34 The details of the
FINRA procedure will be discussed in more depth in Part VI, but at this
time it is important to note that, even over twenty years ago, the Court
recognized the distinguishing characteristics present in consumer-securi-
ties arbitration. Both FINRA and the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion (SEC) put a great deal of effort into making sure that the process
offered by the forum's arbitration meets the precipitous levels of fairness
and trustworthiness that the American court system demands.35 As Con-
gress begins an assault on all consumer arbitration, it would serve these
legislators well to go back and read the McMahon decision and recon-
sider whether consumer-securities arbitration is in need of such a drastic
shake-up. If they did, they would find that all of the evils they are look-
ing to cure were not present in the forum in the first place. McMahon
embodied the judicial recognition of the fairness of consumer-securities
29. 473 U.S. 614, 633-34 (1985).
30. Id. at 628.
31. 417 U.S. 506, 515 (1974).
32. McMahon, 482 U.S. at 233.
33. The NASD merged with the NYSE regulatory arm to create FINRA in July 2007. Stephen
J. Ware, What Makes Securities Arbitration Different from Other Consumer and Employment
Arbitration?, 76 U. CrN. L. Rev. 447, 449 (2008).
34. McMahon, 482 U.S. at 233-38 (noting the extensive oversight the SEC has over the
procedural rules of the forum).
35. Id.
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arbitration, and, if the basic tenets of the Court's argument are still true
today, then Congress should be hesitant to attack this particular brand of
arbitration.
B. Recent Developments in Buckeye Check Cashing
The current judicial sentiment towards arbitration mirrors the faith
in these tribunals that the McMahon Court demonstrated over twenty
years ago. In 2006, the Court gave another vote of confidence to arbitral
tribunals in their decision in Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v.
Cardegna.36 That case involved a class-action suit brought against a
check-cashing company claiming that their predispute arbitration agree-
ments violated several lending and consumer-protection laws.3 7 The
contract originally signed by the plaintiffs contained a predispute arbi-
tration clause that they were seeking to invalidate.38 While the case did
not specifically concern consumer-securities arbitration, the holding is
worth noting because it is illustrative of the current judicial attitude
towards arbitration. First, the Court held that "as a matter of substantive
federal arbitration law, an arbitration provision is severable from the
remainder of the contract."39 Next, the Court held that unless the chal-
lenge was to the actual arbitration clause, any decisions about the valid-
ity of the contract as a whole must be decided by the arbitrator.4 ° Lastly,
this arbitration law applies regardless of whether the case is in state or
federal court.4"
Even though this decision did not deal directly with the FINRA
forum, the substantive law that the plaintiffs brought their claims under
was analogous to the laws that claims were brought under in McMahon.
Both cases involved consumer-protection laws-lending laws in Buck-
eye Check Cashing and securities laws in McMahon-and, in both
cases, the Court ruled in favor of arbitration. It goes without saying that
it is the province of Congress to make its own policy judgments about
protecting consumers, and it is well within their power to overturn the
courts and regulate arbitration in any way they see fit. Even so, they
have completely ignored the sound logic of the judiciary in coming to
their latest conclusion.
36. 546 U.S. 440 (2006).
37. Id. at 443.
38. Id. at 442.
39. Id. at 445.
40. Id. at 445-46.
41. Id. at 446.
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III. PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF CONSUMER-SECURITIES ARBITRATION
The Supreme Court has given resounding support to arbitration, but
Congress has to take into account more than just those nine opinions
when they make decisions. Public perception of political matters is also
extremely important, and arbitration presents several difficult questions
for the academic, legislator, and practitioner alike. The appeal of the
process to large, institutional litigators who have to deal with a wide
variety of lawsuits is unmistakable, but, when government-created
courts are essentially removed from the picture, eternal vigilance is
needed to ensure fairness. This leads to the question of when arbitration
needs to be regulated, and, if regulation is desired, how it should be
enacted. Public sentiment is one of the many forces at work when Con-
gress attempts to answer this question.
A. The Caseload at FINRA
Congress serves at the will of the people and "presumptively has
popular authority for the value judgment it makes."42 Therefore, it is
important to determine whether the public has given Congress a clear
mandate to act to cure unfairness in consumer-securities arbitration.
With the enactment of the FAA, Congress was misled by a well-known
commercial litigator into believing that the FAA was necessary.43 In
attempting to determine the necessity of congressional intervention here,
there is no need to resort to the transcripts of impassioned speeches by
lobbyists; there is actual empirical data on how the public perceives the
forum. There is a vast body of statistical research dedicated to assessing
the public perception of consumer-securities arbitration, but, before
looking into how FINRA arbitration is perceived, it is helpful to obtain a
better understanding of what actually happens to the cases filed there. In
2008, 4,982 cases were filed with FINRA. The most common types of
claims in these cases were misrepresentation, negligence, breach of con-
tract, and breach of fiduciary duty. The most common instruments
involved in the cases were common stocks, mutual funds, and derivative
securities. In 2008, only twenty-four percent of cases filed were actually
decided by the arbitrators. Forty-seven percent were settled directly by
the parties, and ten percent were settled by mediation. Forty-two percent
of cases that were decided by the arbitration panel resulted in an award
to the investor. Last, an astounding seventy-four percent of all cases that
were filed resulted-either through settlement or award by the arbitra-
42. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 208 (1970).
43. Michael H. LeRoy, Misguided Fairness? Regulating Arbitration by Statute: Empirical
Evidence of Declining Award Finality, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 551, 559 (2008). This will be
discussed in more detail in Part IV.
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tor-in some sort of recovery for the investor.4
These statistics provide an important detail that must be taken into
account before looking at the public perception of FINRA arbitration-
most of the cases decided in the forum are never actually decided by the
forum. Reader beware-any criticism of this arbitration process that
claims investors are mistreated has to be reconciled with the fact that
only a small fraction of cases filed each year actually get decided by the
forum that is being challenged.45 The majority of cases are decided by
the parties, without interference. It is completely within reason to
assume that if the plaintiffs in these cases are agreeing to the settle-
ments, then their terms cannot be so egregious and anti-investor as to
warrant congressional intervention.
B. Public Perception
Having set forth the objective statistics about the volume and reso-
lution of arbitrations at FINRA, I will move on to the public perception
of the forum. Any statistics must be taken with a grain of salt, given the
potential for bias among those who filed claims and were not able to
recover the amount they originally sought, regardless of whether their
claims had merit.46 With that being said, there are two main reasons why
the importance of the perception of the forum cannot be understated.
First, the public's faith in the rule of law is intrinsically tied to their
perception of the forum that adjudicates disputes among private citi-
zens-no matter what the forum is. As will be discussed more in Part V,
the proponents of the AFA support the bill because they believe it will
cure a perceived unfairness that exists within consumer arbitration. Pub-
lic perception of the forum is one of the factors-but not the only one-
44. All statistics taken from Dispute Resolution Statistics, supra note 7. It is also important to
note that the low percentage of cases actually being decided by the arbitrators has been consistent
in the last five years. In 2004-08, only twenty-seven, twenty-four, twenty-one, twenty-one, and
twenty-four percent of cases were decided by arbitrators, respectively. Id.
45. Dispute Resolution Statistics, supra note 7.
46. It is important to note that this survey carries a risk of being biased by the overall lack of
responses. The response rate for the survey was only 13.0%. Gross, supra note 2, at 13. The first
point that might indicate potential bias is the fact that of those surveyed, only 23.4% responded
that the customer won an award at the hearing. Id. at 23. This is significantly lower than the forty-
two percent that was reported by FINRA. Dispute Resolution Statistics, supra note 7. Therefore, a
large segment of people that did win awards at hearings did not respond to this survey. This does
not mean that the study is necessarily tainted, but it is worth mentioning because of the possibility
that those who responded to the survey would have a more negative perception of the process than
the average user because they won awards at a significantly lower rate than the average person
who participated in FINRA arbitration. Also, although this survey pertains to NYSE and NASD
arbitration, it can be said to mirror perception of FINRA arbitration because, in between the time
the study was commissioned and the time it was published, NASD and NYSE merged to become
FINRA. Ware, supra note 33, at 449.
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that is rightfully taken into account when deciding whether the AFA
should apply to consumer-securities arbitration.47 Second, these percep-
tions are important because the fairness of the forum cannot readily be
measured in any other way.48
The survey contained a great deal of data and a number of ques-
tions that need not be discussed here.4 9 I am including this study in the
paper only to examine whether there is a strong public sentiment that
consumer-securities arbitration is an unfair process. It is important to
note that the participants in this survey were not just customers. The
groups polled also included lawyers, persons employed by brokers, and
corporate representatives of the firms that are members of FINRA.5 ° The
survey started by asking people if they had any concerns about the fair-
ness of the process before it actually took place. Thirty-nine percent of
participants had concerns about the fairness of the process before they
filed their claims, and twenty-eight percent were concerned that the arbi-
trators would be biased. 5 This is important, because it shows that the
majority of the people who have not used the forum do not have con-
cerns about its fairness. It also raises a warning flag about disputants
being biased against the forum before they ever began the process. Con-
cerning the qualifications of the arbitrators themselves, fifty-eight per-
cent of participants selected that they "Agree" or "Strongly Agree" that
the panel was competent to resolve the dispute, against only 20.6% of
participants who did not believe that the panel was competent to resolve
the dispute. 52 40.4% believed the arbitration panel was open-minded;
compared to 33.3% percent that did not.53 The vast majority of those
polled believed that the arbitrators listened to what all sides had to say
54
and gave ample time for all parties to present their case. Concerning
the procedural aspects of the forum, the number of participants who
believed that the discovery process allowed them to get the information
they needed for the hearing was nearly double the number that did not
find the process to be helpful. 6
47. Clearly the judiciary does not believe that it should, see supra Part II concerning the
McMahon decision.
48. Gross, supra note 2, at 6.
49. It is worth noting-as an example of the SEC's close watch on F1NRA-that this
extensive study was done at the behest of the SEC to monitor public reaction to working with the
forum. Id. at 4.
50. Id. at 17.
5 1. Id. at 21. This does not mean that sixty-seven percent of the participants had initial
concerns, because they were permitted to answer "Yes" to both questions.
52. Id. at 27.
53. Id. at 29.
54. Id. at 34.
55. Id. at 36.
56. The exact percentages were that 49.5% of participants agreed the discovery process
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The most noticeable dissatisfaction with the process does not con-
cern the forum itself, but the ultimate result.57 In spite of this, the num-
ber of people who said they would recommend arbitration to others
slightly exceeded the number of people who said they would
not.58Although less people viewed the forum favorably compared to
those who viewed it unfavorably,59 35.6% of those polled said they
would use the forum again rather than use the court system, compared
to only twenty-nine percent who said they would not.6°
When looking at these results, it is important to keep in mind that
they only represent how people view the process, and not the legitimate
fairness of the process itself. The conductors of the study put it best,
"Thus, these empirical findings shed light on subjective perceptions by
arbitration participants and do not address objective standards of sub-
stantive or procedural fairness. ' '6 That being said, I included this set of
statistics with the purpose of showing there is a general lack of consen-
sus among the public about the fairness of the FINRA forum. Given the
possibility for disdain or preference for the forum based solely on
whether or not the person won their case, it is hard to take these numbers
as an absolute measure of fairness. At best, they can be used to show
that there is no prevalent, overwhelming public perception of the forum
that would serve as a mandate to Congress that would vindicate them in
passing a bill that would eliminate a great deal of the cases that pass
through the forum.
IV. ACADEMIC PERCEPTIONS OF CONSUMER-SECURITIES ARBITRATION
Having addressed the judicial and public opinions about the forum,
it is now time to see how the academic world perceives arbitration.
"Legal scholarship might be said to have two functions: to increase our
knowledge and understanding of the law and legal institutions, and to
shape their development. '62 Arbitration has become an increasingly pop-
provided them with the information they needed, and 29.2% percent disagreed with this statement.
Id. at 32.
57. 55.1% of those polled were not satisfied with the outcome of the arbitration. Id. at 38.
However, forty-six percent of respondents said they would be more satisfied if the award
contained a full explanation of how the arbitrators reached their decision. Id. at 39. A satisfaction
rate as low as fifty percent is probably still indicative of a fair process. In every case that goes to
hearing, there must of course be a winner and a loser. So, it is hard to distinguish whether people
were upset about the outcome because of its lack of explanation or because of its specific
substance. This uncertainty about the origin of the discontent makes it difficult to place great
significance on these particular numbers.
58. Id. at 43.
59. Id. at 44.
60. Id. at 48.
61. Id. at 59.
62. David S. Schwartz, If You Love Arbitration, Set it Free: How "Mandatory" Undermines
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ular topic among the legal-scholarship community, and the number of
papers published on it has risen accordingly.63 I start by looking a histor-
ical lesson about the passing of the FAA noted by one professor. This
example will be illustrative because it shows an academic's perception
that Congress can be manipulated into passing unnecessary regulations
concerning arbitration specifically. I will then conclude by examining
the academic reaction specific to consumer-securities arbitration.
A. Historical Lesson from the Passing of the FAA
Before delving into academic perception concerning consumer-
securities arbitration specifically, it will be helpful to detail one past
perceived error by Congress in a situation analogous to this one. Michael
H. LeRoy presents an interesting question about whether the FAA was
entirely necessary in the first place. His article focuses on empirical evi-
dence concerning vacatur of arbitration awards and what he perceives as
a misstep by Congress in originally enacting the FAA.' He argues that
Congress unnecessarily enacted the FAA, explores the history of courts'
treatment of arbitration at common law, and explains why he thinks the
FAA was actually detrimental to the arbitral process.65 The situation he
critiques presents a valuable analogy by detailing how susceptible Con-
gress can be to overreacting.
LeRoy argues that judicial hostility to arbitration before the FAA
was nothing more than a myth, and presents a line of cases showing that
judges at common law routinely ruled in favor of arbitration.66 Prior to
the adoption of the FAA, judicial policy actually favored arbitration. But
there was popular political support for the bill, and so Congress passed a
law to protect something that needed no protection. 67 LeRoy puts it best
"Arbitration" 30 (Univ. of Wis. Law Sch. Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Working Paper
No. 1052, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstractz1006826.
63. Id. Schwartz notes that
An obscure area generating a small handful of published scholarly articles at
the beginning of the 1980s, arbitration scholarship has boomed: the 300-400 articles
on arbitration now published annually in the pages of the journals included within
the Westlaw database represent a fivefold increase in arbitration articles relative to
published legal scholarship generally.
Id.
64. LeRoy, supra note 43, at 553-56.
65. Id. at 557-58.
66. While it is not necessary to go into the details of these cases here, they are helpful and can
be found id. at 559-60 for state-court cases (Brush v. Fisher, 38 N.W. 446 (Mich. 1888);
Campbell v. Western, 3 Paige Ch. 124 (NY. Ch. 1832); Tankersley v. Richardson, 2 Stew. 130
(Ala. 1829)) and Id. at 575 for Supreme-Court cases (Colombia v. Cauca Co., 190 U.S. 524
(1903); Lutz v. Linthicum, 33 U.S. 165 (1834); Carnochan v. Christie, 24 U.S. 446 (1826)).
67. LeRoy, supra note 43, at 560-63.
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when he says that "Truth lost to political expedience .... ,,68 Although in
this case Congress was acting to expand the power of arbitration-and
with the AFA they are trying to curtail it-the situation is nonetheless
demonstrative of the tendency of Congress to overact.69
B. Academic Perceptions of Consumer-Securities Arbitration
As noted previously, scholarly research and publication on arbitra-
tion has sky-rocketed in the last two decades.70 The debate on the sub-
ject has been quite heated, and-as with any topic in academia-
commentators have brought up a variety of unique arguments for and
against.' For the sake of brevity, I will only discuss the academic per-
ceptions of consumer-securities arbitration in a limited capacity. This is
not because what's being said is not worthwhile, but there is some
degree of repetition amongst the themes-though not the details-of the
arguments from both sides, and they often mirror the challenges that will
be discussed in the Part VI(a) detailing the academic criticism of
mandatory arbitration generally.
One interesting point brought up by Professor Gross is the possibil-
ity that the arbitration process itself is, fair, but that investors whose
cases did not turn out as they had hoped are being lead to believe that it
was a problem with the forum-and not their case-that caused them to
get a disappointing result. "If an investor believes that broker miscon-
duct caused losses in his trading account but an arbitrator does not award
damages to the investor after a hearing on that misconduct, then the
investor blames the arbitrators ... ."I' In the aftermath of a loss at the
hearing or a settlement that was not as lucrative as they wanted, it is
much easier for disputants or their lawyers to complain about the fair-
ness of the forum rather than question whether their complaint was as
strong as they had originally hoped for. Mea culpa is never as satisfying
as slinging mud. It very well could be that it is the outcome of the
case-and not the procedure of the forum 73-that leads the jilted inves-
68. Id. at 563.
69. The analogy to the current situation is striking. Congress is again acting to protect a group
that needs no protection-consumer-securities investors.
70. Schwartz, supra note 62, at 30.
71. For a discussion of the contract-law principles evoked in challenging and defending the
various clauses themselves that are sometimes included in these contracts, see Yvette Ostolaza,
Overview of Arbitration Clauses in Consumer Financial Services Contracts, 40 TEX. TECH L.
Rev. 37 (2007).
72. Jill I. Gross, McMahon Turns Twenty: The Regulation of Fairness in Securities
Arbitration, 76 U. CiN. L. REv. 493, 518 (2008).
73. For a discussion of many of the positive procedural protections the FINRA forum
provides, see Barbara Black, The Irony of Securities Arbitration Today: Why do Brokerage Firms
Need Judicial Protection?, 72 U. CIN. L. REv. 415, 446-53 (2003) ("Reasonable Notice ... Right
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tor to cry foul.
One critic of arbitration procedure has called for an empirical
investigation about the quality of results in mass arbitration as opposed
to litigation. He wants to test the assumption that proponents of arbitra-
tion are often quick to back-that the results in arbitration are at least
equal to results in traditional court litigation."4 An in-depth study into
this question would certainly help to shed light on whether consumer-
securities arbitration is fair to both sides involved in the dispute. Given
the dearth of research in the area, the results of a study looking into this
would be invaluable. For all we know, the forum could actually be more
fair to the consumer. There is a wealth of data concerning consumer-
securities arbitration awards that is publicly available.75 Unfortunately,
this data measured by itself would be largely meaningless. The most
effective way to measure the fairness of the results in consumer-securi-
ties arbitration would be to compare them to results from comparable
cases in the court system. The stand-alone analysis would not be com-
pletely useless, but without an analysis of what the alternative-the
courts-provides, it would be less informative about whether arbitration
gives the same opportunities that litigation does.
That said, gathering this type of data to make a comparison may be
troublesome, given the widespread use of consumer-securities arbitra-
tion. Court-case statistics may not be plentiful enough to provide an
accurate sampling. On the other hand, if it were possible to conduct such
a study, it could be the first step in answering two very important ques-
tions. First, are the results in consumer-securities arbitration more or less
favorable to the consumer than courts are? Second, if they are less
favorable to the consumer, is this why investors feel negatively about the
process? Being able to answer these questions with empirical data would
be invaluable.
Having finished Parts II-IV of this paper, it is clear that there is no
specific group that is crying out to Congress for help concerning predis-
pute clauses in consumer-securities arbitration agreements. Judicial reac-
tion to arbitration has been largely positive. Public perceptions of the
forum are inconclusive-if anything, the majority of people believe that
to Representation by Counsel; Right to Present Evidence . . .Right to Present a Case in a Fair
Geographic Forum ...Right to Adequate Relief . . . Unbiased Decision-Maker . . . Right to
Adequate Discovery ... Right to Know Something of the Panel's Rationale... Arbitration Costs
... Right to Judicial Review.").
74. Jeffrey W. Stempel, Mandating Minimum Quality in Mass Arbitration, 76 U. CIN. L. REV.
383, 405 (2008).
75. Shelly R. James, Arbitration in the Securities Field: Does the Present System of
Arbitration Between Small Investors and Brokerage Firms Really Protect Anyone?, 21 J. CORP. L.
363, 376 (1996). All FINRA arbitration awards are publicly available. FINRA Arbitration Awards
Online, http://finraawardsonline.finra.org/ (last visited Feb. 6, 2009).
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the forum is fair. The results of the survey are certainly nowhere near a
mandate by the people or a definite call to arms. Academic perception of
the forum is both positive and negative, but again, there is no clear voice
one way or the other.7 6 There is no absolute consensus among the groups
about the fairness of the process, but there is also no ringing endorse-
ment. Even though Congress has not been forced to act, it is completely
within their power to resolve the uncertainty in this debate against
predispute agreements. Yet, after reviewing the bill itself, the concerns it
aims to address, and the procedure of the FINRA forum, it will be clear
that the AFA should not apply to consumer-securities arbitration.
V. THE ARBITRATION FAIRNESS ACT (AFA)
Having examined and analyzed the various perceptions about con-
sumer-securities arbitration, it is now time to look at the bill that wants
to change it all. Having seen the arguments for and against this unique
type of arbitration, it will be clear why this bill should not swallow con-
sumer-securities arbitration under its vast umbrella. Upon comparing the
concerns it is meant to address-as well as the statements of those in
support of the bill-to the procedure at FINRA, it will be shown that
this bill should not apply to consumer-securities arbitration.
A. The Bill Itself
The first part of the bill that warrants examination is the "Findings"
section where the author of the bill has the findings of fact he has made
in order to deem the bill necessary. It starts by saying that the FAA was
meant to apply to disputes "between commercial entities of generally
similar sophistication and bargaining power."7 7 Then it says that "A
series of United States Supreme Court Decisions have changed the
meaning of the Act so that it now extends to disputes between parties of
greatly disparate economic power ... ."78 Later it says that "Private
arbitration companies are sometimes under great pressure to devise sys-
tems that favor the corporate repeat players who decide whether those
companies will receive their lucrative business."79 One last important
finding to note is that author of the bill said "Mandatory arbitration is a
76. For a positive perception, see Gross, supra note 72. But see William B. L. Little, Fairness
is in the Eyes of the Beholder, 60 BAYLOR L. REv. 73 (2008).
77. H.R. 3010, 110th Cong. §2(1) (2007), available at http://thomas.loc.govlhomel
gpoxmlc I 1 0/h3010_ih.xml.
78. Id. §2(2).
79. Id. §2(4) (emphasis added). This argument about generating revenue is largely
inapplicable to FINRA because they are a non-profit organization. BrokerCheck Frequently Asked
Questions, http://www.finra.org/Investors/TooIsCalculators/Broker Check/P015174 (last visited
Feb. 6, 2009).
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poor system for protecting civil rights and consumer rights because it is
not transparent."8 These findings show the evident dissatisfaction with
the Supreme Court's recent decisions, but Congress should take a sec-
ond look at whether all the decisions regarding the FAA-specifically
McMahon-should be overturned.
Upon considering these findings, the bill then proposes a series of
changes to the FAA. If it gets passed, these changes will have a drastic
effect on the world of consumer-securities arbitration. The bill would
amend the FAA so "No predispute arbitration agreement shall be valid
or enforceable if it requires arbitration of an employment, consumer, or
franchise dispute; or a dispute arising under any statute intended to pro-
tect civil rights . "..."81 It will also change the FAA so that "[T]he
validity or enforceability of an agreement to arbitrate shall be deter-
mined by the court, rather than the arbitrator, 82 irrespective of whether
the party resisting arbitration challenges the arbitration agreement spe-
cifically or in conjunction with other terms of the contract containing
such agreement. '8 3 The language is comprehensive and clear; this bill is
meant to put an end to consumer arbitration, regardless of the forum or
context.
B. Statements by Senator Feingold
Senator Russ Feingold is the person sponsoring the bill, and his
opening statement to the senate committee he presented it to is informa-
tive. He begins by saying that "One of the most fundamental principles
of our justice system is the right to take a dispute to court."84 There are
80. H.R. 3010, 1 10th Cong. §2(6) (2007), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/home/gpoxm
Ic 110/h3010_ih.xml. Many of these considerations about mandated arbitration generally-as well
as how consumer-securities arbitration addresses them-will be discussed in Part VI of this paper.
81. Id. §4.
82. For a discussion of the law regarding arbitrability of claims and who decides this
question, see First Option of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 943 (1995) ("Just as the
arbitrability of the merits of a dispute depends upon whether the parties agreed to arbitrate that
dispute, so the question 'who has the primary power to decide arbitrability' turns upon what the
parties agreed about that matter."(emphasis in original) (citations omitted)).
83. H.R. 3010, 110th Cong. §4 (2007), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/home/gpoxmlc110/
h30l0_ih.xml.
84. Senator Russ Feingold, Opening Statement of U.S. Senator Russ Feingold Senate
Judiciary Subcommittee on the Constitution on "The Arbitration Fairness Act of 2007," http://
feingold.senate.gov/-feingold/statements/07/12/20071212.htm (last visited Jan. 8, 2009).
Interestingly enough, this first statement can already be exposed as mere puffery just by looking at
the bill itself. The bill carves out a special exception so that it will not affect any arbitration clause
that is part of a collective bargaining agreement. H.R. 3010, 110th Cong. §4 (2007), available at
http://thomas.loc.gov/home/gpoxmlc l10 /h3010_ih.xml. It is true that a union and a company are
probably of more equal sophistication than a customer and a large business, but, if this right to
access to the court system is so sacred, why is someone else allowed to give it away for you just
because you happen to work in a field that has been unionized?
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several other central concerns that Senator Feingold has about
mandatory arbitration. He thinks that mandatory arbitration clauses have
a deteriorating effect on the protections our justice system is meant to
afford, that mandatory arbitration clauses are now utilized to deny peo-
ple their civil rights, and that the costs associated with arbitration act as
a bar to people entering the forum." When speaking about the bill, he
also makes it unequivocally clear that "First, it is intended to cover dis-
putes between investors and securities brokers. I believe that such dis-
putes are covered by the definition of consumer disputes ...we will
make the intent even clearer when we mark up the bill in committee.
86
These are serious allegations against arbitration generally 87-and con-
sumer arbitration specifically-and they will now be addressed.
VI. FINRA GUIDELINES & FAIRNESS
Having heard the arguments of the main proponent of the AFA, it is
now time to respond directly to those criticisms. I will start by address-
ing some of the main concerns relating to general mandated arbitration.
Juxtaposing these criticisms against the realities of the FINRA forum
will highlight the extra steps that are taken to ensure fundamental fair-
ness. Then I will examine the procedural concerns the AFA raises about
the forum itself. Lastly, I will look at the much broader question of the
Constitutional implications of mandatory arbitration clauses in light of
the Seventh Amendment. That said, in order to fully understand the
implications of what arbitration may or may not be taking away, it will
again be helpful to examine what the alternative-the court system-
provides. After looking at the trend regarding motions to dismiss in fed-
eral courts, the procedural protections of the FINRA forum will look
considerably more attractive.
85. Feingold, supra note 84.
86. Id. Senator Feingold has made good on his promise to lump consumer-securities
arbitration in with the rest of consumer arbitration generally. The new version of the bill
specifically includes "services relating to securities and other investments" under the definition of
"consumer dispute." S. 931, llth Cong. §3 (2009), available at http://www.govtrack.us/
congress/billtext.xpd?bill=sl 11-931.
87. For testimony further in support of the AFA that also argues about the Constitutional
implications of mandatory arbitration, see W. Stephen Westermann, Testimony to Constitution
Subcommittee of the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee Regarding the Arbitration Fairness Act of
2007 and the Constitutional Duty of Congress to Restore Citizens' Seventh Amendment Rights, 3
(December 12, 2007), available at http://papers.ssrm.comlsol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1095542
("The primary assertion of this testimony is that... the Framers' election to preserve the common
law fight to civil jury trial in the Bill of Rights rather than in a statute, or not at all, means that
businesses may not remove this fight from citizens by making its waiver a precondition ....").
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A. General Perceptions of Mandatory Arbitration Measured Against
Realities of Consumer-Securities Arbitration
The way the academic world perceives mandatory arbitration gen-
erally is the starting point for this segment of the paper. It is prudent to
focus on the academic reaction to this broader topic before delving into
issues specific to consumer-securities arbitration. Assessing the validity
of these general arguments when applied to FINRA arbitration is the
first step.
One common argument against mandatory arbitration is that there
is a perceived unfairness that manifests when the predispute clause does
not allow a group of consumers to bring a class-action claim. One
scholar cites these clauses as another way for companies-particularly
in the consumer context-to avoid liability because each consumer's
loss will be too financially insignificant to justify them bringing a claim
on their own." They say that because the transactional cost of the poten-
tial litigation-lawyers' fees, filing fees, etc.-will likely outweigh any
possible recovery, consumers will not bring these meritorious claims as
individuals.89 "It is well understood that, but for class actions, many
kinds of legal violations committed on a large scale can go unremedied,
if the damages caused by each individual violation is small enough to
make the filing of individual lawsuits economically unfeasible."9 The
importance of this procedural device cannot be understated, and
FINRA's arbitration proceedings protect it accordingly. Once a class
action has been brought in the court system, the NASD9" Code of Arbi-
tration Procedure for Consumer Disputes (the "Code") specifically for-
bids a member firm or associated person from enforcing an arbitration
agreement against a member-or potential member-of the class.92
Unlike many arbitration administrators, the FINRA forum for consumer-
securities arbitration specifically protects a group of plaintiffs' right to
bring a suit as a class in the traditional government-sponsored court sys-
tem.93 This protection is not mandated by the judiciary or the legislature,
but was implemented by the forum itself. Class actions are seen by busi-
88. Sternlight, supra note 6, at 1652.
89. Id.
90. Schwartz, supra note 62, at 20.
91. This Code is also used by FINRA, but is still referred to as the NASD code after the July
2007 merger.
92. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, CODE OF ARBITRATION PROCEDURE FOR
CONSUMER DISPUTs § 12204(d) (2007), available at http://www.finra.org/web/groups/arbitration
mediation/@ arbmed/@ arbrulldocuments/arbmed/pI 17546.pdf.
93. Even without this protection from the Code, this problem is unlikely to exist in consumer-
securities arbitration because of the substantial amount of money these cases tend to involve.
65.4% of claims brought in FINRA arbitration ask for relief between $100,000-$1,000,000, and
only 12.1% of all claims brought are for less than $25,000. Gross, supra note 2, at 22.
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nesses as one of the "evils" they wanted to avoid by including arbitration
clauses in their contracts,94 and FINRA has voluntarily enacted a provi-
sion in the Code to make sure this fundamental right of the individual is
preserved. This is just one distinguishing characteristic that sets con-
sumer-securities arbitration apart from other forums that are perceived
as procedurally unfair.
Another frequent complaint about mandatory arbitration concerns
the procedural rules of the forums used by businesses. Commentators
cite several deficiencies in arbitration forums, including shortening of
the statute of limitations in order to preclude consumers from bringing
meritorious claims or barring arbitrators from awarding disputants puni-
tive damages." Here again, FINRA procedure distinguishes it from the
field by extending several protections to the consumer. The statute of
limitations for FINRA arbitration is six years, and, even if a claim is
dismissed under this rule, the Code allows for the claim to be refiled in
court after being dismissed from arbitration.96 Also, if a claim is filed in
court, the six-year statute of limitations does not run while the case is
ongoing.97 This set of regulations guarantees that not only will the con-
sumer have at least as much time as they would if they were filing the
case in the court system, but that, if their court case does not turn out as
they wanted it to, they will still have the option to come back to arbitra-
tion. The scheme insures that anyone with a claim has more than enough
time to decide whether to file it, and there is no deliberate attempt by the
forum to strip the consumer of their right to sue. Concerning punitive
damages, arbitrators at FINRA are becoming increasingly likely to
award them-despite the fact that there has been litigation about the
propriety of arbitrators doing this.9 8 This is yet another example of
FINRA distinguishing itself by trying to make sure their forum is as fair
to the consumer as possible while still maintaining a neutral playing
field.
Another important critique of mandated arbitration procedure
revolves around the selection of arbitrators. Studies have shown that in
the minds of the parties involved, the procedural aspects of any system
of dispute resolution are more important in influencing perceptions of
fairness than the results that system produces.9 9 An important part of
that procedure is the arbitrator-selection process. The FAA recognizes
the importance of an impartial arbitrator by providing that an award can
94. Stemlight, supra note 6, at 1638.
95. Id. at 1652.
96. NASD Code, supra note 92, §12206(a)-(b).
97. Id. § 12206(d).
98. Black, supra note 73, at 448.
99. Sternlight, supra note 6, at 1666-67.
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be vacated by the district court where it was issued if the aggrieved party
can prove "there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitra-
tors.""'° It is of paramount importance that the parties involved in any
arbitration have faith in the procedure used to select the arbitrators and
are satisfied with the level of impartiality demonstrated by the arbitrators
that were selected.
There are two arguments promulgated to prove that arbitration
selection is fair in the consumer-securities context. The first is an obser-
vation about arbitrator selection in general and the second is specific to
the procedure of the forum. One commentator reasoned that it is sound
fiscal policy for the businesses involved in these agreements to pick
arbitrators that are fair. It follows that if the arbitrators are corrupt, then
surely the award will be overturned in court later on, and that would cost
more time and money for the company.' This line of reasoning appears
sound on the surface, but for it to have any teeth and really scare busi-
nesses into behaving, it requires a substantial amount of faith in the pro-
cess by which arbitration awards are overturned for impartiality. First,
the customer must recognize when an arbitrator is impartial. Next, the
customer has to have the funds to pay for a lawyer to challenge the
arbitrator's partiality in court. Last-but not least-the court hearing the
case must correctly recognize any potential partiality in the arbitrator(s)
and vacate the award accordingly. There are too many events that need
to happen for the company to be held accountable for their faulty selec-
tion. Therefore, this concept of finding motivation for fairness through
the detrimental economic consequences of impartial arbitrator selec-
tion-although well intentioned-does not reach the punctilio of fair-
ness that our justice system and logical scrutiny demand.
The second guarantee of fairness is specific to how arbitrators are
selected to hear cases at FINRA. FINRA uses a computer system that
randomly creates a selection of arbitrators for the parties to choose
from.0 2 As of August 14, 2009, there were 6,156 arbitrators serving. 03
From this enormous pool, three lists containing eight potential arbitra-
tors are sent to each party."° Once they've received these lists, each
party can automatically disqualify up to four arbitrators from each list
100. 9 U.S.C. §10(a)(2) (2002).
101. Eric J. Mogilnicki & Kirk D. Jensen, Arbitration and Unconscionability, 19 GA. ST. U. L.
REV. 761, 780-81 (2003). The authors also apply this logic to explain why the companies drafting
these contracts would want to leave out any unconscionable provisions, lest they should be
challenged in court and make the business subject to further litigation. Id. at 784.
102. NASD Code, supra note 92, §12400.
103. Dispute Resolution Statistics, supra note 7.
104. NASD Code, supra note 92, § 12403.
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and then rank the remaining four according to their preference.I 5 Once
this is finished, FINRA combines each party's lists and uses their ratings
to select one arbitrator from each group. 106 Each arbitrator is required to
disclose any possible conflict he currently has-or may possibly obtain
while the dispute is ongoing-because of any past or present financial,
business, familial, or social interest he may have in the dispute. 107 Then,
if a party feels that an arbitrator should not be sitting on the panel, they
can challenge him and attempt to get him recused. The arbitrator can
make the decision whether he should recuse himself, 08 and, if the arbi-
trator refuses, the party can appeal to a FINRA Director who will then
make the decision to remove the arbitrator "if it is reasonable to infer,
based on information known at the time of the request, that the arbitrator
is biased, lacks impartiality, or has a direct or indirect interest in the
outcome of the arbitration. ' 19 This allows a person who is not a party to
the dispute or an appointed decision-maker to examine the facts and
decide whether it is in the interest of fairness to allow the arbitrator to
serve. In sum, a tiny number of arbitrators from a pool of thousands is
chosen at random, then both parties have a chance to disqualify half of
them, and, after the arbitrators have seated themselves and disclosed any
conflicts of interest, a dissatisfied party has two routes to attempt to
recuse an arbitrator. Since neither party has any say in the random gen-
eration of the lists and both parties have a chance to automatically strike
half the arbitrators selected, this system goes to great lengths to ensure
that the men and women who sit down to decide these cases are truly
impartial.
The perceived lack of public scrutiny of what some believe to be a
secretive process is another problem commonly associated with
mandatory arbitration." 0 "[P]rinciples of justice require that disputants
have access to a dispute resolution process that is transparent and open
to public scrutiny."'' This proposition is certainly true. It is common
knowledge that people have a hard time trusting the unknown, and arbi-
tration forums should be open about the procedure that takes place
within their doors. This is another positive distinguishing characteristic
about consumer-securities arbitration-it is subject to public oversight
by the SEC. When talking about the procedure at self-regulatory organi-
105. Id. §12404.
106. Id. §§12405--06.
107. Id. § 12408.
108. Id. § 12409.
109. Id. §12410(a)(1).
110. Sternlight, supra note 6, at 1635.
111. Id.
[Vol. 64:339
ANSWERING A CALL THAT WAS NEVER MADE
zations (SRO) like the NASD-which is now FINRAl" 2-the Supreme
Court was particularly impressed with the level of regulation:
No proposed rule change may take effect unless the SEC finds that
the proposed rule is consistent with the requirements of the Exchange
Act, 15 U.S.C. §78s(b)(2); and the Commission has the power, on its
own initiative, to 'abrogate, add to, and delete from' any SRO rule if
it finds such changes necessary or appropriate to further the objec-
tives of the Act, 15 U.S.C. §78s(c). In short, the Commission has
broad authority to oversee and to regulate the rules adopted by the
SROs relating to customer disputes, including the power to mandate
the adoption of any rules it deems necessary to ensure that arbitration
procedures adequately protect statutory rights.'
13
Oversight like this is a sufficient guarantor of openness and fairness that
is unique to consumer-securities regulation. If FINRA wants to change
any rule, the SEC must be convinced that the change is fair to investors;
and they can even make changes to the procedure of the forum sua
sponte. When deciding whether or not to enact the proposed rule change,
the SEC also makes the changes available for public comment." 4 This
way the public gets to have their voice heard by the SEC when they are
deciding whether the changes should be enacted.' " 5 This protocol is one
of the many procedural safeguards employed to ensure that the forum is
fair.
When tested against the general criticisms of mandated arbitration,
consumer-securities arbitration more than passes muster. For every com-
plaint about arbitration, FINRA offers an appropriate response that acts
to ensure a fair process for investors. Still, the drafters of the AFA had
specific concerns about arbitration that also need to be addressed.
B. Responses to AFA Concerns
The first concern raised by Senator Feingold was that mandatory
arbitration was denying citizens the right to the legal protections that the
court system is meant to provide for them.' 16 Although it is impossi-
ble-as well as against the basic purpose of arbitration' 17-to recreate
the exact conditions of the court system, the FINRA forum does an ade-
112. Ware, supra note 33, at 449.
113. Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 233-34 (1987).
114. Sarah Rudolph Cole, Fairness in Securities Arbitration: A Constitutional Mandate?, 26
PACE L. REV. 73, 79 (2005).
115. Current events have further demonstrated the close relationship between the SEC and
FINRA. FINRA CEO Mary Shapiro has recently been nominated by President Obama to head the
SEC. Amit R. Paley, Obama Pick to Lead SEC is Veteran Wall St. Regulator, WASH. POST, Dec.
18, 2008, at DOI.
116. Feingold, supra note 84.
117. Sobel v. Hertz, Warner & Co., 469 F.2d 1211, 1214 (2d Cir. 1972) ("[T]he very purpose
2009]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
quate job of ensuring people that their cases are tried fairly. Many of the
procedural protections provided by the forum were discussed in the pre-
vious section, including-but not limited to-making sure the statute of
limitations is preserved, allowing the awarding of punitive damages, and
creating a selection process that goes to great lengths to ensure arbitrator
neutrality. There is no need to reprint those arguments here, but it is
important to note that for every question, complaint, or gripe, FINRA
procedure-embodied by the Code-had an answer for all of the most
common complaints about mandatory arbitration. During this persistent
pursuit of fairness, consumer-securities arbitration has already evolved
in order to prevent the forum from turning into a one-sided kangaroo
court-without any pushing from the legislature.
Perhaps the most important asset FINRA consumer-securities arbi-
tration has that helps guarantee that people get the legal protections our
democracy demands is the transparency of how these arbitrations are
run, and the ease with which the government can step in to change the
process. The SEC mandates that securities brokers and their employees
register with a self-regulatory organization (SRO) such as FINRA,
which administers the arbitration," 8 and the SEC having oversight of
FINRA is one of the critical factors that serves to guarantee fairness in
this process. As discussed in the previous section, the procedural rules of
the forum are subject to strict oversight by the SEC. This type of trans-
parency is the hallmark of the first step to fairness in a democracy. With
this process, there can be no question about what is happening behind
closed doors, because FINRA and the SEC have flung the doors wide
open and let the crowd comment on what they see.
Another main critique espoused by Senator Feingold in his opening
statement is that mandatory arbitration is being used to deny people their
statutorily guaranteed civil rights. 19 This allegation is no longer at issue
in consumer-securities arbitration. FINRA Dispute Resolution used to
hear cases regarding statutory employment-discrimination claims, but a
perceived unfairness in this practice became a catalyst for change. In
1998, a rule change was adopted that excused employment statutory dis-
crimination claims from mandatory arbitration at FINRA and allowed
aggrieved employees to bring their cases to court. 120 Nine years before
Senator Feingold introduced this bill and made an opening statement
clarifying that he was going after the securities industry, the forum that
administers arbitration in the securities industry had preemptively cor-
of arbitration ... is to provide a relatively quick, efficient and informal means of private dispute
settlement.").
118. Cole, supra note 11, at 28-29.
119. Feingold, supra note 84.
120. Cole, supra note 114, at 77-78.
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rected one of the wrongs he was going to cite in support of the need for a
disallowance of predispute arbitration clauses in consumer contracts.
This willingness to evolve and adapt to cure problems as they arise-
without Congressional intervention-is another move that is indicative
of the fundamental fairness that the FINRA forum aims to provide.
Another complaint cited by Senator Feingold in support of the AFA
was that arbitration is often far too expensive, and that the administrative
costs associated with the process will often inhibit people from bringing
meritorious claims.' 2 1 It is true that if large costs are associated with
having a case heard then this could scare people away from trying a
case. It would be untenable to argue that it is fair to force someone to
pay more in administrative costs than they could win at the hearing.1
22
However, FINRA already has provisions in place to ensure that no per-
son is driven away from filing a claim because of the potential costs
associated. If a disputant makes a showing of "financial hardship," then
the filing fee associated with the claim can be waived. 23 Even if the
customer originally pays a filing fee, if he or she settles the claim more
than ten days before the scheduled final hearing, part of the filing fee is
refunded to them. 24 After the initial filing fee, there are only costs asso-
ciated with the process occur when the disputants have a hearing ses-
sion, and, for small claims, the fee is only fifty dollars per session. 25 In
contrast to the low expenses consumers incur, firms that are sued in the
forum are forced to pay most of the costs. Their filing fees are higher,
26
they are forced to pay an additional fee as soon as they bring a claim or
are named as a party, 27 and they are forced to pay fees when the arbitra-
tor lists are sent out and-in some cases-when the hearing dates are
set.' 28 The distribution of costs in consumer-securities arbitration dis-
tinctly favors the consumer. Also, FINRA provides a wide range of geo-
graphic options for people to present their cases, holding arbitrations in
121. Feingold, supra note 84.
122. For a discussion of what effect distribution and imposition of costs have on the
enforceability of arbitration provisions, see Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79
(2000).
123. NASD Code, supra note 92, §12900(a)(1). §12900 also contains the list of fees for filing
a claim. For a customer who claims losses equal to or under $1,000, the fee is only $50. For a
customer who claims losses from $1,000.01-$2,500, the fee is only $75. The highest possible fee
is $1,800, and that is for customers who are claiming they have lost over $1,000,000.
124. Id. §12900(c)(1).
125. Id. §12902(a)(1).
126. Id. §12900(b)(1). As shown supra note 123, a customer pays a fifty dollars filing fee for a
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seventy-two different cities with at least one location in each state.1 2 9
This ensures that disputants will not be forced to endure a long, cost-
intensive journey to have their claims heard; they will be able to find a
forum relatively close to where they live to ensure maximum conve-
nience. 13 The value of having a forum for the dispute close to home
also goes to rebut Senator Feingold's argument that the prohibitive costs
of arbitration lead people to not bring claims. With possible fee waivers,
extra fees to securities firms, and relatively inexpensive hearing session
fees, it is hard to argue that the costs of FINRA arbitration could act as a
bar against someone bringing a claim. If the potential plaintiff is desti-
tute, the fee will be waived, and-as discussed above-the multitude of
hearing locations ensure that there will be one relatively close to the
disputant's home.
C. Be Careful What You Wish For-Pretrial Dismissal-
FINRA v. Federal Courts
So much time is spent criticizing arbitration for its flaws, and yet
commentators rarely expand the focus of their investigation to look at
the broader picture of how results in arbitration compare with results in
the court system. When one such comparison was done in the employ-
ment field, the findings were distinctly supportive of arbitration. Of
employment arbitrations conducted by the American Arbitration Associ-
ation (AAA), employees won sixty-three percent of all arbitration cases
filed, which is enormous compared to similarly situated employees' suc-
cess rate of fifteen percent in federal court. 13 ' A different study revealed
that individual employees won fifty-one percent of the arbitrations they
filed, while the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission only won
twenty-four percent of the cases they filed in the court system. 32 Admit-
tedly, these surveys suffer from two glaring weaknesses. One, they only
deal with a small cross-section of the cases handled in arbitrations each
year. Two, when giving up the right to a jury trial is at issue, it can be
the sacrificing of that right, and not the ensuing result, that is problem-
atic. Nevertheless, these numbers serve as an encouraging sign about the
fairness of arbitration, and an important caveat for the proponents of the
AFA-will the court system ultimately be any more beneficial to con-
sumers than arbitrations are? If the AFA passes, will the courts offer a
129. FINRA Dispute Resolution Fact Sheet, http://www.finra.org/ArbitrationMediation/About
FINRADR/Overview/FactSheet/index.htm (last visited Jan. 16, 2009).
130. For a discussion of the propriety of forum-selection clauses based on contract-law
principles, see MIS Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972) and Carnival Cruise
Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991).
131. Mogilnicki, supra note 101, at 763-64.
132. Id. at 764.
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harsh dose of reality or a sanctuary from the much-maligned world of
arbitration? Comparing the procedure for pretrial dismissal in federal
courts to the analogous procedure in consumer-securities arbitration
offers a chilling wake-up call for the proponents of the AFA.
The argument that mandatory arbitration agreements infringe on a
consumer's Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial has been made by
both Senator Feingold 133 and academics alike.1 34 The central focus of
this paper was to prove that the process at FINRA is fair enough so that
people signing contracts with predispute arbitration clauses are not get-
ting their rights revoked by agreeing to arbitrate there. The last part of
this paper will focus on comparing the showing that needs to be made to
get a claim dismissed from consumer-securities arbitration before trial to
the showing required for this in federal courts. While detractors of arbi-
tration-like Senator Feingold-have argued that predispute arbitration
clause may pose Seventh Amendment1 35 problems, critics have also
argued that federal courts' new enthusiasm for motions to dismiss under
Federal Rule of Procedure 12(b)(6) 136 also violates the Seventh Amend-
ment. 137 Looking at the trends in the two systems regarding pretrial dis-
missal is informative.
In the last quarter century, the Supreme Court has fallen in love
with any procedural device that helps them get rid of cases faster. 38
There are two hallmark cases in this field, Celotex Corp. v. Catrett
39
and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly. 140 Celotex made an important decla-
ration opening up the availability of summary judgment141 when Justice
Rehnquist said, "Summary judgment procedure is properly regarded not
as a disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather as an integral part of the
133. Feingold, supra note 84.
134. E.g., Sternlight, supra note 6, at 1643.
135. "In suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the
right of trial by jury shall be preserved ...." U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
136. Under this rule, judges can dismiss a case for "failure to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted." FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
137. See Suja A. Thomas, Why the Motion to Dismiss Is Now Unconstitutional, 92 MINN. L.
REV. 1851 (2008).
138. For a discussion of this Seventh Amendment problem in securities litigation in federal
courts, see Suja A. Thomas, The PSLRA's Seventh Amendment Problem, U. Cin. Public Law
Research Paper No. 07-03, 6 (2007), available at http://papers.ssrm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstractid=968893 ("[T]he standards established by the Courts of Appeals interpreting the strong
inference requirement are problematic under the Seventh Amendment. The standards set forth thus
far involve one or more improper steps by which the courts assess the reasonableness of the facts
and corresponding inferences pled by the plaintiffs.").
139. 477 U.S. 317 (1986).
140. 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
141. For a critique questioning the constitutionality of the use of summary judgment in light of
Seventh Amendment concerns, see Suja A. Thomas, Why Summary Judgment is Unconstitutional,
93 VA. L. REV. 139 (2007).
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Federal Rules as a whole ... " 142 More recently, Twombly has throttled
the legal world by overturning Conley v. Gibson's "no set of facts" lan-
guage in regards to the requirements of what must be presented at the
pleading stage in order for a complaint to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion
to dismiss. 4 3 Justice Souter reshaped the pleading standard when he
said
Asking for plausible grounds to infer an agreement does not impose a
probability requirement at the pleading stage; it simply calls for
enough fact to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will
reveal evidence of illegal agreement. . . . The need at the pleading
stage for allegations plausibly suggesting (not merely consistent with)
agreement reflects the threshold requirement of Rule 8(a)(2) that the
"plain statement" possess enough heft to "sho[w] that the pleader is
entitled to relief.'144
This type of language signifies the Court's current movement toward
allowing procedural devices to be used more liberally in order to get
cases dismissed at an earlier stage. With these types of decisions being
issued, plaintiffs in federal court have a quickly shrinking chance of
being able to have their complaints heard at a full trial. At the same time,
FINRA is moving to curtail an arbitrator's ability to dismiss a complaint
before a hearing on the merits.' 45 There was a recent amendment to the
rule governing motions to dismiss at FINRA, and it increased access to
the forum by making it significantly harder for motions to dismiss to be
granted prior to a full hearing.1 46 Under the new rule, motions to dismiss
are to be strongly discouraged; 47 will have to be unanimously agreed
upon by all arbitrators and include a written explanation of why the
motion was granted;' 48 and can only be granted if the arbitrators decide
there was a prior settlement agreement that the nonmovant is not honor-
ing 1 49 or the plaintiff has sued the wrong respondent. 5 ' Juxtaposing this
trend towards making it harder to grant motions to dismiss at FINRA
against the trend towards liberalization of the procedures to dismiss
cases in federal courts, it becomes clear that the proponents of this bill
142. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 327.
143. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 560-63.
144. Id. at 556-57. Twombly was an antitrust case. But, the Supreme Court has recently held
that the Twombly interpretation of Rule 12(b)(6) is applicable to all cases regardless of subject
matter. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1953 (2009).
145. In a recent study, only 2.1% of survey participants reported that their claim was dismissed
before a hearing. Gross, supra note 2, at 23. Even before the proposed rule change, only this very
small number of cases got dismissed before a hearing.
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should be careful what they wish for. By attempting to give consumers
back their chance to go to court, they might actually be taking away the
chance for them to get their case heard. When set in the context of the
harsh procedural realities of the federal court system, this seemingly
proconsumer piece of legislation is more chimerical illusion than talis-
manic cure for what ails the common investor. What sounds good in
principle may turn out to be a nightmare in practice. Cases that would
have satisfied FINRA's lax grounds for inclusion and made it to an evi-
dentiary hearing may be kicked out of federal court at the pleading
stage.
VII. CONCLUSION
Throughout this article I have set out to prove that consumer-secur-
ities arbitration administered by FINRA should fall outside the umbrella
of the AFA. Even though the AFA was created because members of
Congress believed that the Supreme Court has changed the meaning of
the FAA,15 the legislators should look back at McMahon-as well as
FINRA's procedural guarantees of fairness-and reconsider whether
they need to strike a killing blow to this decision. We are in the midst of
an academic and legislative assault on mandatory arbitration, and some
of the claims that its detractors make may have a logical basis when
brought against other arbitration forums, but FINRA is different. The
forum has been approved by the judiciary, has gotten only mixed-if not
moderately positive-reviews from the public, and academics' main
criticisms of mandated arbitration do not pass muster in light of the pro-
tection given to investors who are looking to bring claims in this specific
forum.
Government oversight-in the form of the SEC-also provides a
unique guarantee of trustworthiness within the forum. If Congress is not
happy with the way the SEC is regulating the arbitration at FINRA, then
they should take a more moderate step to cure the problem. Since the
SEC currently has the power to do whatever it pleases within FINRA,
Congress should start by keeping a closer eye on the SEC, FINRA, and
the procedure at the forum before they completely wipe it out. If they
have specific problems with any one aspect, they have the power to leg-
islate that the SEC should change it. It would be a shameful waste to let
this sophisticated system which administers thousands of cases every
year idly rot because of one flawed bill. Before Congress eliminates it
and subsequently dumps all of these cases on the already overcrowded
151. H.R. 3010, 110th Cong. §2(2) (2007), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/home/gpoxm
Ic II0Oh3010_ih.xml.
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federal docket, they should consider a more active role in the monitoring
of the forum as opposed to a complete destruction of it.
Before members of Congress go to vote on the AFA, they should
thoroughly reconsider whether they are using a brush with too broad of a
stroke to amend the FAA. They owe it to their constituents to read
McMahon again and to examine just what happens at FINRA Dispute
Resolution. Compared to the alternative-the federal-court system-
they might find that consumer-securities arbitration is actually quite ben-
eficial. The procedural realities of the federal-court system could turn
out to be a wolf in sheep's clothing for investors looking to get their
claims past the pleading stage, and right now they have somewhere they
can go to get their voices heard. Congress should also go back and look
at who is really challenging them with this call to arms. If the people are
not dissatisfied with the forum, and the judiciary is not dissatisfied with
the forum, then the individual members of Congress should look into the
subject and make their own informed policy decision instead of follow-
ing the lead of a few men on a mission. What they find might surprise
them.
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